Introduction
Plato laboured hard to characterize the di erence between genuine knowledge and mere belief. He may be read as having claimed the knowledge is justi ed true belief (Meno 97e{98a, Theaetetus 201c{202d). This account became the standard analysis of knowledge for more than two millennia. Since knowledge entails belief on the standard account, any attempt to fathom out the foundations of knowledge must include an analysis of belief. After Edmund Gettier (1963) shook the standard account, many philosophers argued that the standard tripartite de nition needs to be supplemented by a fourth condition. One particular prominent a venue was to take the stability or indefeasibility o f a b elief under criticism as a necessary condition for it to qualify as knowledge { an idea that can also be traced back to Plato's Meno. This suggests that it is not only the set of current beliefs but also the potential development of the agent's beliefs that is relevant t o k n o wledge. 1 Aristotle opened his Metaphysics with the statement that all men by nature desire to know ( Met. 980a). How can this objective be pursued? If knowledge is (or implies) justi ed true belief then the agent has to check for justi cation, truth and belief. Ideally, from a rst-person perspective, everything one beliefs seems justi ed, so this criterion is not helpful for the agent. Truth, on the other hand, is not transparent to agent (it can only be judged from a third-person perspective). Again ideally, belief is transparent to the agent. As a matter of internal control, there is one thing that an agent can do in the pursuit of truth. Since knowledge entails truth and since contradictions cannot be true, the agent has to eliminate contradictions from his beliefs in order to avoid falsehoods. 2 1 There are philosophers, however, who deny that knowledge entails belief. In another famous little paper of the 1960s, Colin Radford (1966) presented a case of an agent who reliably answers questions without being conscious of the truth of his answers. This, Radford argued, is a case of knowledge without belief. 2 The maintenance of consistency may also be regarded as a problem not for belief as consciously experienced or expressed by the agent, but for belief as ascribed to the agent b y a third person. Such a view can indeed take inspiration from Aristotle: \For it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe and if it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject . . . ,a n di fa no p i nion which contradicts another is contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time." (Met. 1005b, transl. W.D. Ross) The 1980s saw the development o f a v ariety of logical models that explicitly addressed the problem of maintaining consistency in beliefs. The prototypical problem dealt with is the one when an agent meets with new information that contradicts what he has believed to be true, as, e.g., when a scienti c theory is falsi ed by an experiment. It was often proclaimed that the particular way of choosing among consistent successor belief sets was guided by an economy principle. I am referring to belief revision theory, which is also known as the theory of theory change. 3 The theory has been limited to some extent, because it stipulates that contradictions are always resolved in such a w ay that the new piece of information is accepted. However, this restriction seems to me of minor importance, one that does not invalidate the discussion below and that has recently been recti ed anyway. 4 What is the role played by logic (deduction and induction) in the acquisition of knowledge? Deductive logic serves as a standard against which to measure whether potential belief sets are free of contradictions or not. Inductive reasoning always involves decisions as to which sentences to adopt. Logic in a narrow sense refers to formal models of deductive reasoning, axiomatic systems which should preferably come together with some semantic underpinning. Logic in a wider sense is the theory of good reasoning, providing us not only with the means to check candidate belief sets for consistency but also with a methodology for deciding which of the candidate belief sets to adopt. The choice of a belief set is based on extralogical considerations, but only if we refer to the narrow conception of logic. I will in this paper proceed on the assumption that logic does include rules that are relevant for processes of belief formation and transformation (a kind of inductive reasoning, see Spohn 2003) . We shall see that we can clearly distinguish an idea of economical behaviour (behaviour dictated by considerations of economy) f r o m economic behaviour (behaviour as recommended by economics). We will ask to what extent the two ideas have a s a matter of historical fact become embodied in formal models for belief formation and transformation, and we will address the question to what extent they should be respected in these models. In this paper, I want t o h a ve a look at the role that the science of economics may play in logic broadly conceived. In order to do this, I make extensive use of material that is discussed in more technical detail in other publications of mine (Rott 2000 (Rott , 2001 . While the present p a p e r m a y a ord a convenient survey of previous work, it may unfortunately not be easily accessible to people without prior knowledge of the belief revision literature. Such readers are advised to check with the literature to which I refer. The rst thing to do for us now, however, is to get an idea of what economics and economy are all about. 3 The landmark paper is Alchourr on, G ardenfors and Makinson (1985) , for book-length treatments see G ardenfors (1988), Hansson (1999) and Rott (2001) .
What is economics?
One way of nding out what a term means is to look at the science that is supposed to study it. For the word`economic', this seems to be an easy task. We just have to look at what economics is about. Dictionaries de ne`economics' as the scienti c study of the production, distribution and consumption of goods, services and wealth, or more concretely, the study of the system of trade, industry, money etc. But we w ant to dig deeper. According to Francis Y. Edgeworth (1881, p. 16 ), \ t]he rst principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest." This restriction to a completely sel sh attitude has long been removed. The formal part of Edgeworth's idea, however, remains valid. In the words of Herbert Simon: \The rational man of economics is a maximiser, who will settle for nothing less than the best." 5 This still seems to be the dominant view, as is shown by a few more recent statements. Hausman (1998, Sections 1 and 2) gives the following summary of the dominant s c hool in the 20th century:
The main`orthodox',`neoclassical', or`neo-Walrasian' school models economic outcomes as equilibria in which individuals have done as well for themselves as they could given their preferences and the constraints on their choices. . . . Agents are rational in the sense that their choices are determined by their preferences, which are complete and transitive. .. . contemporary theoretical economics is largely a theory of rational choice. This may seem surprising, since economics is supposed to be an explanatory and predictive science of the actual interactions among people rather than a normative discipline studying how people ought rationally to choose, but it is indeed a fact.
In another handbook article, Rosenberg (1995) tells us about the \assumptions of the`economic man': that all agents have complete and transitive cardinal or ordinal utility rankings or preference orders and that they always choose that available option which maximises their utility or preferences". Earlier the same author characterised economics as guided (or misguided) by an \extremal intentional research programme" (Rosenberg 1983) . 6 And what is being maximised is utility. According to Broome (1999, p. 21{22) : \`utility' acquired the meaning: the value of a function that represents a person's preferences. . . . T h e rst principle of economics is . . . utility theory,. . . m o dern, axiomatic utility theory . . . " What is common to these very abstract formulations of the basic tenets of modern economics is that economic agents are viewed as having de nite preferences, and that when choosing actions or commodities, they aim at satisfying their 5 The quotation is taken from McFadden (1999, p. 73) . Simon himself famously advocated an alternative model of rationality, viz., that of satis cing instead of maximising. In this model, economic agents set out for achieving a certain level of aspiration, without investing any extra e orts to nd out whether they could obtain something even more valuable.
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According to Rosenberg (1983) , economics is not an empirical science, but a branch o f applied mathematics { but Rosenberg does not say applied to what. My picture below is more in line with the view that economics is a normative discipline, a theory of rationality. Draft vincecec.tex 5 May 2003, 10:38 preferences as well as the circumstances allow. It is important to note that not just any kind of preference is considered to be appropriate. Preferences have to be transitive and complete (technically speaking, they must be pre-ordering or weak orderings), in order to be representable by a suitably chosen utility function. Ties in preferences are permitted, of course, but incomparabilities are ruled out. 7 With a little exaggeration, one can say that economics is based on (or: is an elaboration of) the theory of rational choice. Here, choice is called rational or coherent if and only if it is representable by a preference relation, and a preference r elation in turn is considered to be rational if and only if it is representable by a utility function. 8 Economics, then, is about rational rather than the actual behaviour of individuals. 9 The laws of economics should not be expected to be empirically adequate, they are valid only as idealisations, or as norms. Economics is based on a formalised variant of common-place folk psychology with individual-level explanation of free agents. It is essential to the research program of economics proper that processes pertaining to whole societies or economies are to be explained by, or reduced to, the behaviour of egocentric, maximising agents. 10 Usually, it is assumed that comparability of preferences or aggregability o f u t i lities across di erent individuals does not make sense. It is important, however, that the possibility of comparison and aggregation is taken for granted across di erent \attributes" or \criteria" of goods, as well as across di erent situations in which the same goods are available (in varying amounts). This is part of ordinal and expected utility theory, and I suspect that this may ultimately be the reason for the economists' insistence on a person's preferences being representable by a utility function. In order to nd out whether there is anything economic (referring to economics in this abstract standard sense) about belief revision, we will have t o l o o k f o r patterns of rational choice, i.e., choice that is maximising with respect to some underlying preferences, or more exactly, to some weak ordering which c a n i n 7 Bernard Walliser (personal communication) has told me that the widespread insistence on transitive and complete preference relations has been due to the fact that for a long time, economists simply did not know h o w to handle intransitive and/or incomplete relations. Now that they know h o w to treat them, the insistence has gone. For some state-of-the-art work in this area, see Ok (2002) and Eliaz and Ok (2003) . 8 It takes more than transitivity and completeness for a preference relation to be representable by a utility function. An additional technical continuity property is needed (Debreu 1959, pp. 54{59) . A concise presentation of ordinal and expected utility theory is given by Hausman and McPherson (1996, Chapter 3:`Rationality'). 9 This is economics in a narrow sense. Economics in a wider sense has a social component and presumes interpersonal comparability or aggregability of preferences. Blending with social science, political philosophy and ethics, it includes considerations of justice, fairness, solidarity, liberty and equity in the distribution of scarce goods. All this supplements, or rather corrects, the rather restricted focus on maximization in economics in the narrow sense. The present paper does not address any social component of rationality, n o r a n y social phenomena in doxastic matters (like common or distributed belief, information exchange, or multi-agent belief revision). 10 \Egocentric" is not meant to imply \sel sh" here. Egocentric agents only look at their personal preference, but the preferences themselves may e m body all kinds of (possibly altruistic) thoughts and feelings.
turn be represented by a utility function.
3. Acting economically, a second view: \Informational economy"
There is an alternative and perhaps more intuitive concept of \acting economically" that has played an important role in the development of the research on belief revision. Belief revision is often thought t o b e economical behaviour rather than economic behaviour. In the English language, there is a division of labour between the adjectives \economic" and \economical". The former is closely tied to the noun \economics" and means either \of or referring to economics", and has \pro table", \remunerative" and \gainful" as potential synonyms. The adjective \economical", on the other hand, is closely tied to the noun \economy" and means essentially the same as \thrifty", \frugal" or \not wasteful". This particular di erence of meanings turns out to be useful for our discussion. The perspective o f economy (rather than economics) w as forcefully taken in Peter G ardenfors's in uential book Knowledge in Flux (1988) . A glance at the index of the book makes it immediately clear that the criterion of informational economy is employed to motivate the essential parts of the formal modellings of G ardenfors and his collaborators Carlos Alchourr on and David Makinson. G ardenfors refers to this criterion for the motivation of belief expansions (1988, p. 49) , belief revisions (pp. 53, 58) and belief contractions (p. 61). 11 Basically, the criterion is taken to be identical with the idea of minimal change (p. 53) and the conservativity principle (p. 67). According to G ardenfors, The key idea is that, when we c hange our beliefs, we w ant to retain as much as possible of our old beliefs { information is in general not gratuitous, and unnecessary losses of information are therefore to be avoided. (G ardenfors 1988, p. 49, similarly on pp. 16, 157) Ever since the appearance of G ardenfors's book, the criterion of informational economy has been taken to be a \hallmark" of the research paradigm created by A l c hourr on, G ardenfors and Makinson (henceforth, AGM). 12 There is, however, reason for asking why exactly a rational person should be conservative. G ardenfors's argument that information is not gratuitous does not seem to be su cient, because information, even if costly, m a y be wrong, and even if it is correct, it may be misleading. Spelt out a little more explicitly, the argument for conservatism seems to be this: Throughout this paper, it is presupposed that revisions have t o b e successful in the sense that they e ciently incorporate the speci ed new piece of information into the current belief set. Contractions are called successful if they e ciently remove some speci ed sentence from the belief set (unless that sentence happens to be a logical truth).
The rst premise is hardly controversial, it might e v en be called analytically true as a prescription of economic rationality. 13 The second premise, on the other hand, is much harder to justify. Its truth (or at least our feeling that it is true) may h a ve e v olutionary reasons { probably the human species would long have been extinct if too many of the sentences we accept as true were wrong. Therefore, it is at least likely that many of the sentences that we happen to hold true have some survival value. 14 But the argument for conservatism is a far cry from waterproof. Problems are not hard to come by. Isn't it all too obvious that what we h a ve is not always best? So why should we care to preserve it? It is true that we l o s e information or content when we give up some sentences of our belief set, but it is not clear whether we lose some truths, and no-one should object to losing falsities. Notice that there is a basic tension here between the economical and the economic precept for belief dynamics: The former tends to recommend leaving everything as it is, while the latter recommends striving for the best.
Economic and economical considerations in belief revision theory
In asking what is economic about belief change, we h a ve t o k eep in mind two di erent aspects. Besides the choice-preference-utility line of thinking that we sketched in Section 2, we h a ve found a second type of idea in the thrifty clinging to the sentences one has accepted. (Notice that thrift in itself does not play a prominent role in the science of economics.) In the work of AGM, it is comparatively easy to recognise the criterion of informational economy a t w ork in expansions of belief sets by s e n tences that do not contradict the prior belief set. In such cases, AGM recommend simply to add the new sentence to the prior beliefs and take the deductive closure of everything taken together. 15 However, as we shall see, there are no traces of this criterion for the belief-contravening case which, after all, is the case for which logical models of belief change have primarily been devised. But G ardenfors's argument for conservatism can be generalised. In my v i e w , i t is one of the most important philosophical insights of belief revision theory in the 1990s that belief states cannot be represented properly by belief sets only. Something else has to be added, namely, some structure that encodes how the agent is to revise his belief set in response to surprising information. Typically there is a mechanism exploiting some sort of selection function or preference 13 However, it abstracts from the case that one may b e forced to give a way w h a t i s v aluable, or that one may invest something at a given time in order to make pro t later on. 14 I am ready to grant that this train of thought is not very compelling. Alternatively, the second premise might be replaced by another one which, however, is at least as dubious: \It is always better to have something than to have nothing."
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In the following, a belief set is meant to be a set of sentences that contains its own logical consequences. Thus we endorse the idealisation or stipulation that the beliefs of an agent b e deductively closed.
relation. 16 Let us use a neutral name and call the structure exploited by t h e mechanism a belief-revision guiding structure. 17 It turns out that if the new information is inconsistent with the presently accepted belief set, it is impossible to apply the pure idea of informational economy on the level of sentences. However, the idea can be applied on the level of revision-guiding structures. This at the same time de nes a form of conservatism that is usable for iterated belief change. Fig. 1 gives a representation of the various senses that \economic" and \econom-ical" can take in belief revision contexts. The branch at the left indicates the idea that economic agents may be conceived of as rational or coherent c hoosers. Though this has not been the principal motivation of belief revision models, we will later see that exactly this idea casts a long shadow in the realm of belief formation. 18 On the right-hand branch, we represent the idea of informational economy that has always been advertised as the prime driving force of belief 16 Sometimes, as in approaches working with belief bases, use is made of a partitioning or lumping together of the informational contents of the beliefs . Belief-revision guiding structures typically encode more information than the set of current beliefs. Since such structures in general allow to retrieve the set of current beliefs, there is no need for a second component specifying the belief set. Therefore, it is possible to formally identify the agent's belief state with a belief-revision guiding structure.
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As pointed out by Olsson (2003) , there is a link with the theory of choice in the early history of belief revision theory in G ardenfors's (1978/79) article on Ramsey test conditionals. Here G ardenfors tried to simulate Lewis's (1973) logic for counterfactuals that is based on a revision theory. In the next four sections, we will trace a few important distinctions within the principle of informational economy, also known as principle of minimal change or conservatism. The principle of informational economy with respect to sentences tells us: \Don't give a way y our beliefs beyond necessity!" The principle of informational economy with respect to revision-guiding structures tells us: \Don't change your doxastic preferences beyond necessity!" These two maxims can further be distinguished as to whether they apply to the belief-contravening case (the one for which belief revision models have primarily been invented) or only to the case where the new information is consistent w i t h the agent's belief set. At the bottom there are six dots standing for options of belief base revision, where belief bases are sets of sentences that need not obey the static coherence constraint of logical closure. We will not be concerned with this approach in this paper, 19 but instead focus on methods of changing belief sets that are presumed to be logically closed { i.e., on the upper six dots. \Ba-sic changes" represent options that neither recognise the economical constraints possible worlds semantics with choice functions. Philosophically, h o wever, G ardenfors set out to avoid possible worlds semantics and replace it by a belief revision semantics for conditionals (for some serious formal problems of this undertaking, see G ardenfors 1986 , Fuhrmann 1993 and Arl o-Costa and Levi 1996 . In hindsight, it is somewhat ironic that 10 years after G ardenfors's early article, Grove (1988) showed how closely AGM's belief change model in terms of partial meet operations relates to the systems-of-spheres modelling of Lewis after all.
of minimal change nor the economic constraints concerning the rationality o f choices. Moving from left to right in the lattice of the six dots adds economical constraints of minimal change, moving downwards adds economic constraints on the rationality o f c hoices. The label \c-conservative" denotes conservativity in the case where the input is consistent with the current belief set, without a similar commitment for the belief-contravening case. Before entering the systematic discussion, let us add a few historical remarks. As the talk of \dimensions" meant to suggest, it is possible to add to the basic form of belief revision elements of conservatism and elements of rational choice independently from one another. In their seminal work of the 1980s, AGM explored pure conservatism with respect to sentences (so-called maxichoice contraction and revision functions) and completely unconstrained choices (the case where only AGM's six basic rationality postulates hold). 20 However, they rejected the idea of maxichoice functions as intuitively inadequate, and I think it is fair to say that the main elegance and force of their theories derives precisely from the supplementary postulates that go beyond the basic case. So what makes the work of AGM distinctive is, on the one hand, a rather strong concept of rational choice generated by transitive and connected preferences, and on the other hand a rather weak concept of conservatism. They provided for conservatism with respect to beliefs in the consistent case (where revision reduces to set-theoretic addition plus logical closure), but they provided neither for conservatism in the belief-contravening case nor for conservatism with respect to revision-guiding structures (they provided no change mechanisms for revisionguiding structures at all). So contrary to wide-spread folklore, AGM paid a lot more respect to ideas found in economics than to the idea of informational economy. Systematic variations of the strength of the relevant ideas were investigated only in the 1990s. On the one hand, weakenings of AGM's strong presuppositions with respect to the rationalisability o f c hoices are suggested by Lindstr om (1991) and Rott (1993 Rott ( , 2001 . 21 On the other hand, strengthenings of the very weak concept of conservatism in AGM are investigated by Boutilier (1993 Boutilier ( , 1996 and Rott (2003a) . Interestingly, it has turned out that the most e cient w ay { and perhaps the only way { of implementing conservatism with respect to beliefs in the belief-contravening case is at the same time a form of conservatism with respect to revision-guiding structures. This variant of conservative b e l i e f revision has actually rst been discussed as a particular strategy of extending the classical AGM model in order to equip it with means for performing iterated belief revisions. While Boutilier did that in a context that presupposes the full strength of AGM's requirements for rational choice, Rott lifts this restriction and shows that the conservative method can be brought to bear without any assumptions about the coherence of the choices involved. (1985) .
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For similar projects in the related eld of non-monotonic reasoning, see Schlechta (1996) and Lehmann (2001) . 22 But see footnote 34 below. Draft vincecec.tex 5 May 2003, 10:38 This little sketch of some developments in the belief change literature shows that the concept of economical belief change is independent of the concept of economic belief change. In the sense speci ed, AGM belief revision (minus two axioms for revisions by inputs that are consistent with the prior belief set 23 ) i s not at all economical but, thanks to AGM's \supplementary" postulates, fully economic the conservative approach i n vestigated in Rott (2003a) on the other hand is very economical, but not at all economic. In the following sections, we recapitulate relevant parts of the actual development of belief revision theory, and then discuss the merits and problems of changing beliefs economically. I will rst detail my reasons for claiming that conservatism with respect to beliefs has hardly been followed in classical AGM-style belief revision models, and that it is doubtful indeed whether it would be a good idea to follow it. Conservatism with respect to belief-revision guiding structures has been studied as a particular strategy for iterable belief change, but it has turned out that it should not be followed either. On the economics side, I brie y survey the (severe) constraints on rational choices have been endorsed in classical AGM-style belief revision and its iterable extensions. Although the AGM postulates can be liberalised systematically according to one's wishes, I will nally argue that even modest economic postulates for belief change are problematic { just as problematic as even the fundamental constraints on rational choices are. We shall nd that doxastic preferences appear to be context-dependent, a fact that gives rise in particular to a formidable problem sometimes labelled \the informational value of the menu".
5. Informational economy with respect to beliefs: What has been done?
In discussing informational economy with respect to beliefs, we will keep on making two important idealisations: We stipulate that the set of sentences accepted by an agent be logically consistent and closed. This condition is, of course, wrong as a description of the set of sentences that a real agent w ould assent to when queried in an interview. However, if we consider a belief set to be the set of sentences that we ascribe to an agent from a third person perspective, or the set of sentences that the agent i s committed t o , then the ideas of consistency and closure lose their implausible appearance. Another simpli cation we m a k e is that when a belief set is revised in response so some new piece of information, the revision process successfully incorporates the new information, so that it is in fact an element of the revised belief set. This is not always sound strategy in realistic belief change situations, but I think we can safely disregard the complications for the discussion to follow. So let us call a consistent and logically closed belief set that includes a new piece of information a candidate revision of a belief set B by . A (candidate) revision of B by is called belief-contravening, i f is inconsistent with B.
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In the common numbering of axioms, these are the third and fourth AGM postulates taken together they state that if : is not in B, then B equals Cn (B f g).
Let us discuss two attempts at capturing the idea of informational economy o n the level of beliefs:
(1) When accepting a new piece of information, an agent should aim at a minimal change of his old belief set.
(2) If there are di erent w ays of e ecting the belief revision, the agent should give up those sentences that are least entrenched.
These two maxims have frequently been appealed to as the principal motivation for logical models of belief change. However, in their most straightforward readings, they are a caricature of what has really been done in the development of the standard models of belief revision. I have argued for this in Rott (2000) , and brie y recall the results presented in that paper.
As regards maxim (1), one can show t h a t n o t wo distinct belief-contravening candidate revisions of a consistent and logically closed belief set by a sentence can be set-theoretically compared in terms of the sets of sentences on which they di er with the prior belief set. For the discussion of maxim (2), we need a little bit of terminological preparation. A sentence is more e n t r enched in a belief set than another sentence if and only if the agent holds on to and gives up upon learning that (it may be the case that) not both and are true. 24 A new piece of information is called moderately surprising if : is a non-minimal element of the prior belief set with respect to epistemic entrenchment. Let us call a revision by amnesic if the revised belief set consists of nothing else but Cn ( ) (where Cn is some ordinary well-behaved Tarskian logic) otherwise we call the revision anamnestic. N o w suppose we w ant to revise a belief set by a sentence and identify two elements of the initial belief set that non-redundantly entail : . Then it may well happen, when performing an ordinary AGM-style revision by , that the agent removes the more entrenched and retains the less entrenched sentence. An instance of such a situation can indeed always be identi ed when is moderately surprising and the revision by is anamnestic. Thus neither of the two maxims that have a l w ays belonged to the core rhetoric about AGM-style belief change models is actually obeyed in these very models. This observation may seem too ba ing at rst sight, but it has turned out to be rather robust. We brie y present four objections and give rejoinders to each of them. For a more extensive treatment, the reader is referred to (Rott 2000) . First, one may hold that it is not belief revision, but belief contraction that is the right kind of operation to be judged in terms of minimal change. As was mentioned above, AGM rst thought of focussing on so-called \maxi-choice contractions", but these were immediately seen to yield counterintuitive consequences. 25 On a more general level, the postulate of \Recovery" says that 24 See G ardenfors and Makinson (1988) and Rott (2001) . 25 Alchourr on and Makinson (1982) proved a result that may be viewed as a strong argument against maxichoice revisions as applied to belief sets.
inserting back again a belief that had just been withdrawn should recover the whole of the original theory. Recovery was explicitly introduced as a codication of the idea of minimal change. However, it ful ls this function only partially its e ects are destroyed if the contraction is part of a revision using the so-called Levi identity and, most importantly, the recovery condition has been forcefully and severely criticized on intuitive grounds by m a n y authors (see Hansson 1999 , Section 2.3). Second, the well-known representation theorems of AGM (and their possibleworlds reinterpretation by Grove) seem to show that \rational" belief contraction and revision operations can be represented as being generated by a minimization process with respect to some underlying preference relation. However, the interpretation of such a preference relation is completely open (it might, for instance, mean remoteness rather than closeness) the minimization process is compromised by o verriding principles of preference and indi erence 26 andnally, since the AGM postulates do not encode any notion of minimal change in the belief-contravening case, we should not even expect to nd substantial traces of this idea in a semantics that can be proved adequate for the AGM axiomatization. Third, it may be pointed out that we need not aim at the preservation of all of our old beliefs, but only of those that are true. So even if the idea of informational economy is not e ective when applied to the whole of the prior belief set, it may still do good work if we restrict our attention to the beliefs that we really treasure, viz., the true beliefs. Unfortunately, h o wever, that move does not help either, since essentially the same results can be reproduced for the conservation of true beliefs as for the conservation of beliefs tout court: No two belief-contravening candidate revisions of a consistent belief set that contain di erent sets of true beliefs can be set-theoretically compared in terms of the true beliefs on which they di er with the prior belief set. A fourth route to saving the idea of minimal change can be taken by applying the idea of informational economy not to belief sets, but to richer representations of doxastic states: to belief-change dispositions, or equivalently, to structures suitable for guiding (iterated) belief revision. This is a point that we will address presently in some detail. Before doing that, however, we h a ve a l o o k at potential norms for belief change.
6. Informational economy with respect to beliefs: What should be done?
First of all, we h a ve t o b e a ware of the fact that the demand for informational economy con icts with other desiderata. For instance, it competes with the synchronic or static coherence constraints of logical consistency and closure. I f we nd ourselves caught in an inconsistency, w e should give u p something and we t ypically have t o g i v e up not only a single culprit sentence, but also many sentences that are deductively related with the latter. This is because we w ant to maintain the logical closure of our belief sets. But of course, a change that is minimal subject to the constraints of consistency and closure will in general be a bigger change than one that is minimal when no constraints are to be respected. Conservativity m a y itself be viewed as a criterion of diachronic or dynamic coherence (Rott 1999) . There are more concepts of coherence that we will have reason to consider below, viz., dispositional coherence and temporal coherence. At this juncture it is not at all clear whether the latter two concepts give rise to more requirements that compete with the requirement of informational economy. Secondly, it is instructive to contrast the ideas that are advocated in the logical literature on belief revision with ideas recommended by philosophers of science who usually think of belief change as arising in the (r)evolution of scienti c theories or research programmes. For the latter point of view, it may su ce here to rely on the elementary but thought-provoking little book The Web of Belief by Quine and Ullian (1978) . In Fig. 3 , the`virtues' of hypotheses that these authors mention are contrasted with the criteria advocated in the belief revision literature. These terms will be explained in due course. What we can immediately see from Fig. 3 is that informational economy is the only criterion that is endorsed both by Quine and Ullian and the logical modellings of belief revision. A moment's thought makes it clear that at least some of the virtues listed here compete with one another. Simplicity often requires deviations from informational economy, m o d e s t y con icts with refutability. W e d o n ' t h a ve to commit ourselves to one or the other set of criteria here, nor do we need to specify some ranking or weighting of the criteria. It is enough at this juncture to note that an account o f h o w t o i n tegrate various criteria of theory choice (the perspective dominant in the philosophy of science) and theory change (the main perspective of philosophical logic) is badly needed, but has never been o ered. There is no obvious reason for according informational economy a privileged status among the many c o n tenders that we h a ve identi ed. It seems fair to say that informational economy can only claim a very restricted normative force.
Conservatism with respect to belief-revision guiding structures:
What has been done?
We n o w turn to a second interpretation of the idea that agents should aim at preserving what they have. The propositional content encoded in sentences of the agent's language is not the only kind of information that may be deemed valuable. We might also be interested in preserving the non-propositional information encoded in belief-revision guiding structures, i.e., in richer representations of belief states. Two such representations that have gained some currency in the literature are two kinds of doxastic preference r elations to which w e shall now turn. First, we consider plausibility orderings of the set W of possible worlds, with the understanding that u v means that u is at least as plausible as v in the belief state represented by . 27 Given such an ordering , the core set min W = fu 2 W : there is no v 2 W such that v ug of the -minimal worlds contains exactly those worlds that are consistent with the current b e l i e f set B, i.e., those that could be the real world given what the agent b e l i e v es. The ordering of the remaining worlds re ects their relative distance from this core set. Belief revision prompted by a new piece of information then proceeds by manipulating the ordering of worlds in such a w ay that all the minimal worlds in the revised ordering satisfy . This constraint is mild and leaves a lot of leeway for the exact speci cation of a coherent revision mechanisms. The most conservative or economical way o f c hanging the plausibility ordering that respects the constraint w as rst de ned and investigated by Boutilier (1993 Boutilier ( , 1996 : This reading is perhaps that reverse of what the reader has expected. An explanation for having more plausible theories smaller under is that they are less distant from the agent's beliefs and expectations.
Here ] denotes the set of all possible worlds satisfying . Given the basic constraint that the set min W of worlds de ning the revised belief set B should be identical with the set min ], 28 the ordering preserves as much of the ordering as possible. 29 Another way of richly representing belief states consists in entrenchment orderings of the set L of sentences (phrased in a given language), with the understanding that means that sentence is at least as entrenched a s sentence in the belief state represented by (as already indicated in Section 5). Given an entrenchment ordering , the set min L = f 2 L : there is no 2 L such that < g of sentences that are minimally entrenched contain exactly the the agent's non-beliefs, i.e., the complement of his belief set B. T h e ordering of the sentences within B re ects how rmly they are endorsed by t h e agent, the relative tenacity with which the agent is determined to cling to his beliefs. In this model, belief revision prompted by a new piece of in formation proceeds by manipulating the ordering of sentences in such a w ay that is not minimally entrenched under the revised ordering . A constraint following from basic AGM-theory is that the revised belief set B = L ; min L should be the set f 2 L : : < ! g. 30 Again, this constraint is mild and leaves a lot of leeway for the exact speci cation of the appropriate revision mechanism. The most conservative or economical way o f c hanging the entrenchment ordering that respects the constraint i s i n vestigated in Rott (2003a) Given the above-mentioned constraint, this ordering preserves as much o f the prior entrenchment ordering as possible. To see this, we look at the pairs for which reverses the ordering of . When do we h a ve but not ? Inspection of the de nition shows that this can only happen if is in, but is not in B , and this deviation is well motivated by the fact that non-beliefs can never be as entrenched as beliefs. Conversely, when do we h a ve but not ? Inspecting the de nition once more, we nd that this can only happen if is not in B , and the same motivation applies: non-beliefs are the least entrenched sentences. We see that there is no unforced 28 More formally, the constraint s a ys that the revised belief set B should be identi ed with the set of all sentences that are satis ed by e v ery world in min ].
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This claim is true if is connected (i.e., \fully economical" in our sense) which i s w h a t Boutilier presupposes. The claim becomes problematic if the restriction to connected preference relations is lifted. See footnote 34 below. deviation of from . This is why this recipe de nes the most conservative or economical way o f c hanging an entrenchment ordering (cf. Rott 2002a) . 31 It has turned out (Rott 2003b ) that the account based on entrenchment orderings is essentially a generalisation of the possible worlds account proposed by Boutilier. In the speci c context of the full comparability assumption made by Boutilier, however, the methods are equivalent. Both methods satisfy an axiom for iterated belief revision which is su cient t o c haracterise conservative revisions of richer representations of belief states. It is su cient t o d e a l w i t h the case of two subsequent revisions. Any nite number of further revisions can easily be constructed from this case by induction. As shown by Boutilier (1993 Boutilier ( , 1996 and, in a more general setting, by Rott (2003a) , a repeated conservative change of B rst by a sentence and then by a second sentence leads to the same result as a single conservative revision of B by , i f is inconsistent w i t h the result of the revision of B by . T aken together with basic AGM theory, this amounts to the following recipe for iterated revision: Why w ould we w ant to call this recipe \conservative"? Because the upper case is just AGM's c-conservativity generalised to the iterated case. And the lower line suggests that if cannot be accommodated consistently, the way of handling it in the revised belief set B is just the same as it was in the original belief set B. Loosely speaking, the structure of the old belief set is stronger than the new piece of evidence , making it seem as if the agent had never learnt a b o u t . 32 8. Conservatism with respect to belief-revision guiding structures: What should be done?
Almost immediately after Boutilier had suggested conservative belief revision as a natural extension of the AGM model, Goldszmidt and Pearl (1994, 1997) discovered that the behaviour de ned by this model is queer. They gave the following example. A person who we m a y for the sake of argument t a k e t o b e in a state of complete ignorance observes an animal that she takes to be a bird (b). As the animal comes closer, the person perceives that the animal is red (r). A few moments later, she realises (perhaps informed by an ornithologist) that the animal is not a bird after all (:b). If we use Boutilier's method of conservative belief revision, the result of these three subsequent revisions is Cn ( ) b r : b = Cn(:b). Goldszmidt and Pearl rightly argue that this is counterintuitive. Why \forget" the colour of the animal just because it turns out that it has misclassi ed as 31 Notice that this procedure tends to introduce new comparabilities: Any new non-belief is comparable to every other sentence, even if it was an`isolated' belief before.
32
The appearance is deceptive, though, since in general ( ) 6 = and ( ) 6 = . Draft vincecec.tex 5 May 2003, 10:38 a bird? In more general terms, it can be shown that this model is temporally incoherent. The AGM-postulate of \success" for revisions says that the most recent piece of information should always be included in the revised belief set. Thus, at the moment of receipt a piece of information is being treated as the most important one. But this privilege is immediately lost when another, new piece of information happens to come in. To see this, let , and stand for sentences that are pairwise consistent, but jointly inconsistent. Then iterated conservative c hange of the trivial belief set Cn ( ) rst by , then by and nally by results in the belief set
The rst and the last piece of information are stronger than the one that comes in between. Conservatism with respect to revision-guiding structures thus has unacceptable consequences when applied as a method for iterated belief revision. It violates the requirement that a good method of belief revision be temporally coherent, i.e., coherent in its attitude towards the value of the recency of information. Both AGM's and Boutilier's models assume that the orderings of worlds or sentences involved are complete pre-orderings, i.e., that all worlds and all sentences are comparable as regards their plausibility o r e n trenchment, respectively. I t might be suspected that the problem of conservative revision is (at least in part) due to the strong requirements of \dispositional coherence" inherent i n the AGM model upon which Boutilier's model is built. However, the unwelcome e ects of temporal incoherence remain present in exactly the same way e v en if all of the dispositional requirements of the AGM model are dropped (Rott 2003a) . As long as one decides invariably to accept new information (i.e., to regard the last piece of information as the most important one), the only coherent attitude towards the recency of information is to regard the second-last piece of information as the second-most important one, and so on. Instead of Cn ( ) as above, the desired result would thus be
There is an alternative model of iterated belief revision that yields precisely this result. This less conservative, more moderate model has been mentioned and used quite a number of times in the literature, without there being a canonical paper where the model was rst endorsed. 33 I take the opportunity t o g i v e de nitions paralleling those that characterise conservative belief change. Like the latter de nitions, the de nitions of moderate belief change make good sense also for the case when dispositional coherence is not presupposed.
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To m y k n o wledge, the model was rst studied systematically by Abhaya N a yak (1994, also see Nayak et al. 1996 Nayak et al. , 2003 , but many people have had the idea independently of Nayak. See Liberatore (1997) , Glaister (1998), Kelly (1999) , Konieczny and Pino Perez (2000) , Papini (2001) , Nayak, Pagnucco and Peppas (2003) . I discuss the merits of this model and explain my label \moderate belief revision" for it in Rott (2003a In marked contrast to conservative belief change, the case distinction for moderate belief change tests the consistency of with respect to the previous input sentence , and not with respect to the intermediate belief set B (which includes ). That the most recent piece of information still is the preferred one is evident from the lower line of this de nition. Otherwise, however, the method of moderate revision goes some way t o wards treating and symmetrically. Philosophically, this seems to be on the right track, since here the two pieces of evidence are grouped together and distinguished from the initial theory B (which m a y n o w be regarded as playing the role of a general \background theory"). In conservative belief change the rst piece of evidence, , is merged 34 If a preference relation is not connected, i.e. not fully economic, its conservative revision cannot strictly speaking be called fully economical. F or any t wo relations R1 and R2 over a given domain, we can de ne the di erence between R1 and R2 to be the set of pairs in the domain that are related by R1 but not by R2, or vice versa. The di erence between an ordering of possible worlds and its revision is not strictly smaller for conservative revision as it is for, say, moderate revision. Consider three -worlds w1, w2 and w3. Let w1 w2, l e t w3 be unrelated by to both w1 and w2, and suppose that both w1 and w3 are minimal in ]. Then conservative revision with respect to introduces the new comparison w3 w2 which moderate revision does not. Thus the di erence between and its conservative revision by is not strictly smaller (in terms of set inclusion) than between and its moderate revision by . So for the concept of informational economy to make perfectly well-de ned sense, it seems that fully economical behaviour is presupposed. This suggests that the ideas of economy and economics in belief change cannot be neatly separated from each other { pace Rott (2003a). with B, and only after the merging is done, the second piece of evidence, , gets processed. At this second stage, there is no reliable way of knowing that had been the same kind of thing as . Having gone thus far, it is natural to argue in favour of a perfectly symmetrical treatment of the pieces of evidence and thus call in question the primacy of the most recent piece of information as expressed by A GM's success postulate and respected by all the methods we h a ve been discussing so far. Being altogether indi erent t o wards the time at which a certain piece of information is received is certainly a form of temporal coherence, too. This is an interesting topic for further research, but it cannot be dealt with here. We n o w leave the eld of \economical reasoning" and turn to \economic reasoning", i.e., to the left branch of Fig. 1 which refers us to the realm of choices, preferences and utilities.
9. Rational choices and logical properties: What has been done?
As pointed out above, the classical AGM model of belief revision embodies a strong idea of dispositional coherence. More precisely, the agent's dispositions to change his belief set in potential revisions are re ected in choice functions that can be rationalised by a complete pre-ordering. That is, the agent a c t s as if he was a maximiser with respect to such an ordering. That the ordering is complete means that all possible worlds are presumed to be comparable with each other in terms of plausibility (Alchourr on, G ardenfors and Makinson 1985, Grove 1988) , and all sentences are presumed to be comparable with each other in terms of entrenchment (G ardenfors and Makinson 1988) . These facts nd expression in the seventh and eighth postulates of AGM which constrain the agent's disposition to change his belief set: ( 7) which is sometimes called Disjunction in the premises and ( 8) which is sometimes called Rational monotonicity.
So far we h a ve been discussing preference relations between worlds and sentences. We will now adopt a related, but slightly general approach using choice functions. Preferences are used in the selection of elements from a given`menu' of options open to the agent, and the economic man will usually select those that are`best' according to his preferences. In the converse direction, suppose that we h a ve given a certain choice function that selects, for each potential menu, the elements that are`best' in some unspeci ed sense. It is a sensible question to ask whether there exists a preference relation such that the choices as determined by the choice function can be rationalised as picking the best elements according to . It is an important fact that not just any c hoice function can be rationalised in this way, and in it is in this sense that the approach using choice functions is more general than the approach based on preference maximisation. The question is how t o c haracterise, in purely choice-theoretic terms those choice functions that are rationalizable by some preference relation. Rott (2001, Chapter 7) describes how exactly one can use semantic choice func-tions (for the selection of most plausible worlds) and syntactic choice functions (for the selection of least entrenched sentences) in the construction of belief revisions, and also how postulates for belief revision correspond to rationality requirements for semantic and syntactic choice functions. 35 Table 1 shows how a n umber of postulates for belief revision correspond to requirements for the choice functions that govern the selection of most plausible models or the selection of least entrenched sentences. In the table, refers to a choice functions which selects for any menu S the (typically non-empty) choice set (S) of`best' elements of S. Assuming that the domain of is closed under nite unions and di erences, the proof of this observation is straightforward. I take it that the multiplicity of conditions that have been used by researchers in di erent c o n text testi es to the importance of these conditions, or to the representability in terms of a complete and transitive relation. Many concrete systems of belief revision, however, do not satisfy ( 7) and ( 8) { a fact that shows that these AGM axioms are very strong. Knowing this, it is reassuring to nd that one can draw on the rich resources of the theory of rational choice in order to introduce appropriate weakenings of the belief revision postulates. Both Property and Property + can be weakened in various interesting and reasonable ways, some of which are represented in the table. Postulate ( 7c) is a weakening of ( 7) that corresponds to the condition Cut in non-monotonic reasoning the parallel weakening of Property does not seem to play a n y signi cant role in the theory of rational choice. The weakening ( 8c) of ( 8) corresponds to the condition of cumulative monotonicity in non-monotonic reasoning the parallel weakening of Property + is known as Aizerman's axiom in the theory of rational choice (see Moulin 1985) . Postulates ( 8d), ( 8wd) and ( 8vwd) are known as variants of Disjunctive rationality. The latter two conditions have a w ell-established counterpart in the theory of choice, viz., Sen's Property . P ostulate ( 8n) is known as negation rationality in non-monotonic reasoning. The theory of rational choice has turned out to be a powerful instrument suitable for analysing and constructing revision operations that are much more exible than the original AGM ones. Seen from this perspective, belief revision theory can indeed be interpreted as being based on economical principles. We are now going, however, to cast a shadow o ver this neat picture.
POSTULATES FOR REVISIONS POSTULATES FOR CHOICES
10. Rational choices and logical properties: What should be done?
Almost from its beginning the classical theory of rational choice has been subjected to serious criticism. In this section I will present an argument t o t h e e ect that a fundamental problem for the theory of rational choice transfers directly to belief revision theories.
Consider the following example. A well-known philosophy department has announced a position in metaphysics. Among the applicants for the job there are a few persons we happen to know. First, there is Amanda Anderson, a young but already distinguished, excellent metaphysician. Second, we h a ve Bernice Becker, who is also de nitely very good, though not quite as accomplished, in metaphysics as Andrews. Becker has also done some substantial research i n logic. A third applicant is Carlos Cortez. He has a comparatively slim record in metaphysics, but he is widely recognised as one of the most brilliant logicians of his generation. Suppose that our initial set of beliefs and expectations about the case includes that neither Anderson nor Becker nor Cortez will get the job (say, because we think that Derek Davidson, an outstanding metaphysician, is the obvious candidate who everyone expects to be appointed anyway). Let us also be clear about the fact that there is only one job available. Consider now three hypothetical scenarios, each of which describes a potential development of the selection procedure (the scenarios do not describe a sequence of stages of the procedure). In each of these alternative scenarios we a r e genuinely taken by surprise, because we learn that one of the candidates we had believed to be losing will be o ered the position. To make things shorter, we introduce some abbreviations. Let the letters a, b and c stand for the statements that Anderson, Becker and Cortez, respectively, will be o ered the position. Scenario 1. The dean tells us in con dence that it has been decided that either Anderson or Becker will be appointed. 36 This message comes down to supplying us with the premise a _ b. Given this premise, we conclude that Anderson, being the better metaphysician, will get the job. We also infer that the other candidates will return empty-handed. Scenario 2. This is a very unexpected scenario in which w e are told by the dean that Cortez is actually the only serious candidate left in the competition. Fortunately, there is no need to invest a lot of thinking here. We accept c in this case. Scenario 3. In this scenario the dean tells us that it has been decided that either Anderson or Becker or Cortez will get the job, thus supplying us with the premise a _ b _ c. This piece of information triggers o a rather subtle line of reasoning. Knowing that Cortez is a splendid logician, but that he can hardly be regarded as a metaphysician, we realise that competence in logic is considered to be a non-negligible asset by the selection committee. Still we k eep on believing that Cortez will not make it, because his credentials in metaphysics are just too weak. Since, however, logic appears to contribute positively to a candidate's pro le, we conclude that Becker, and not Anderson, will get the job. This qualitative description should do for our purposes, but for readers who prefer more precision, the following story may help. The selection committee 36 We take it for granted in this example that the dean is not playing games with us, that she is not lying, that she has the relevant knowledge etc. has decided to assign points to evaluate the candidates' work. Anderson scores 97 out of 100 in metaphysics, but as she has done no logic whatsoever, she scores 0 here. Becker scores 92 in metaphysics and a respectable 50 in logic. Cortez scores only 40 in metaphysics, but boasts of 99 in logic. In scenario 1, we take it that metaphysics is the only desideratum, so clearly Anderson must be the winner. Scenario 2 is trivial. In scenario 3, we gather that, rather unexpectedly, logic matters. As can easily be veri ed, any w eight w e attach t o logic between 1 = 10 and 1 = 2 (with metaphysics taking the rest) will see Becker e n d u p i n f r o n t of both Anderson and Cortez. L e t u s n o w summarise our conclusions from the various premises that the dean supplies us with. Our initial belief set B contains :a, :b, :c and d among other things. In scenario 1, the new piece of information a_b leads us to accept a and :b (along with :c as well as :d which w e will not mention any more). In scenario 2, accepting c simply makes us retain :a and :b. In scenario 3, the new piece of information a _ b _ c leads us to accept that :a and b. W e can now show that this situation refutes some of the basic logical principles of \economic" belief revision. First, the example shows that Disjunction in the premises, ( 7), does not hold. Take ( 7) and substitute a_b for and c for . Then notice that :b is believed if the input is a _ b, and also if the input is c. But :b is not believed if the input is a _ b _ c. T h us the revised belief set B (a _ b _ c) does not include what is common to B (a _ b) a n d B c, and ( 7) is violated. Secondly, w e nd that the situation does not conform to the weakened monotonicity postulate ( 8c). Take ( 8c) and substitute a _ b _ c for and a _ b for . E v en though we believe that a _ b is true if we are given the information a _ b _ c, it is not the case that everything believed on the basis of the latter is also believed on the basis of (a _ b _ c)^(a _ b) which is equivalent with a _ b. Sentences :a and b are counterexamples. Thus the revised belief set B (a_b_c) is not a subset of the belief set B ((a_b_c)^(a_b)) = B (a_b), and ( 8c) is violated. A fortiori, ( 8) is violated as well. What do these problems derive from? We said that principles of belief revision can be systematically interpreted in terms of rational choice. On this interpretation, Disjunction in the premises, ( 7), turns out to be an instantiation of one of the most fundamental conditions { perhaps the most fundamental condition { of the theory of rational choice: Sen's Property . This condition, also called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives or Cherno property, says that any element w h i c h is optimal in a certain menu remains an optimal element after some other elements have been cancelled from the menu. The three scenarios in our example are modelled after well-known choice situations in which Property is violated { cases that also happen to infringe Aizerman's axiom. Both properties may fail to be satis ed if the very`menu' from which the agent i s i n vited to choose carries important information. This phenomenon which Sen calls the`epistemic value' or the`epistemic relevance of the menu' 37 suggests that the context of choice has a decisive in uence upon the shape of the preference relation of the agent { an idea strongly opposed to the idea of context-independent preferences that underlies the classical theory of rational choice. The locus classicus for the problem is a passage in Luce and Rai a (1957, p. 288 ) who chose to avoid the problem of the epistemic value of the menu b y at:
This illustrates the important assumption implicit in axiom 6 essentially Property , H.R.], namely, that adding new acts to a decision problem under uncertainty does not alter one's a priori information as to which is the true state of nature. In what follows, we shall suppose that this proviso is satis ed. In practice this means that, if a problem is rst formulated so that the availability of certain acts in uences the plausibility of certain states of nature, then it must be reformulated by rede ning the states of nature so that the interaction is eliminated.
This may m a k e good sense as a rejoinder in the context of the general theory of choice and decision. An explanation of how information is surreptitiously conveyed through the particular contents of the menu and how it a ects the chooser's preferences is simply not this theory's business. Unfortunately, the same defence is not available for the problem highlighted by our example above. It is the task of the theory of belief formation to model how one's prior belief set is a ected by information received from external sources. This is precisely what this theory has been devised to explain, and therefore the anomaly cannot be pushed to a neighbouring research eld. We cannot nd fault with the dean's message for the very fact that it conveys information! The question raised by our example is a general one. It is hard to get rid of the feeling that the dean's remark about the nal candidates tells us more than meets the ear. The fact that a logician gets mentioned as a top-ranking contender or that logic becomes a topic seems to carry surplus information, over and above the propositional content of the corresponding statement. Does the very fact that a sentence is o ered in a menu for acceptance have a special relevance for processes of belief revision that has been overlooked so far? Or are there other ways out of the predicament?
Conclusion
We h a ve reviewed work in the tradition of the AGM approach to belief revision, arguably the most prominent logical paradigm for the puri cation of belief sets from contradictions. Our overarching questions were to what extent economic(al) principles have played a role in the actual development of this paradigm, and to what extent such considerations should have b e e n f o l l o wed. Our conclusions are mostly negative. Informational economy (conservatism) with respect to beliefs, although widely advertised as the central motivation of belief revision models, turns out not to have played anything like a dominant role in the development of such models, and we h a ve found no reason why i t should. Conservatism with respect to revision-guiding preferences has fact been suggested as a strategy for iterated belief revision, but it soon turned out to have u n welcome consequences. So belief revision theory has as a matter of fact not focused on economy, and the idea of economical belief revisions has very limited normative force, too. Regarding economic belief revision, our ndings are more encouraging. It is possible to reconstruct large parts of belief revision in terms of rational choice theory. As a matter of fact, ideas coming from economics have prevailed in the AGM paradigm and related approaches. However, at the end of the paper we h a ve found that a fundamental problem of the general theory of choice seriously infects the speci c application area of belief revision. Thus the use of rational choice theory has helped us to spot a new puzzle rather than to solve old problems. There is a lot of work that waits to be done in cognitive economics. 38 delberg, forthcoming.
